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Sexual Orientation, Disclosure and Earnings
*
 
Gay/bisexual workers tend to earn less than other men. Does this occur because of 
discrimination or because of selection? In this paper we address this question and collect 
new information on workplace disclosure to separate out discrimination effects from selection 
effects. Using a large sample of recently graduated men in the Netherlands, we find that 
gay/bisexual workers earn about 3 to 4 percent less than other men. Our disclosure 
estimates, however, provide little evidence that the labor market discriminates against 
gay/bisexual workers. They rather support the selection story, most prominently observed 
among undisclosed gay/bisexual workers who concentrate in lower paid occupations, and 
earn about 5 to 9 percent less than other men. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J15, J24, J71 
  






Department of Economics 
University of Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 11 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
E-mail: e.j.s.plug@uva.nl     
 
                
 
                                                 
* This research is supported by the Dutch National Science Foundation, VIDI grant no. 452.03.309. For 
helpful comments, the authors thank Monique de Haan, Virginia Maestri, Jacopo Mazza, Hessel 
Oosterbeek, Reyn van Ewijk, Mathieu Valdenaire, and conference participants. Copies of the 
computer programs used to generate the results presented in this paper are available upon request 
from the authors. 1 Introduction
Although it is only recent that economists began to focus on the relationship
between sexual orientation and earnings, one observation appears to be quite
persistent across a small but growing number of empirical studies: gay/bisexual
men earn less than other men. Over its cause, however, economists do not
agree. Some argue that it is a discrimination e￿ect: employers treat observably
similar workers with di￿erent orientation di￿erently. Others argue that it is a
selection e￿ect: workers with di￿erent orientation are unobservably di￿erent in
their productive skills or tastes. 1
The disagreement illustrates the di￿culty to empirically separate discrim-
ination e￿ects from selection e￿ects. There are -we think- two information
problems that complicate the interpretation of sexual orientation estimates.
The ￿rst problem is that, when it comes to the workers’ sexual orientation,
researchers are often better informed than employers. If the workers’ sexual
orientation is known to us researchers but unknown to some employers, part of
the estimated sexual orientation e￿ect cannot be attributed to treatment di￿er-
entials but must come from productivity di￿erences. The second, and perhaps
more serious, problem is that, when it comes to the workers’ productive skills,
employers are usually better informed than researchers. If gay/bisexual and
heterosexual workers look similar to researchers but di￿erent to employers, the
estimated sexual orientation e￿ect may merely re￿ect productivity di￿erences
that are observable to employers but unobservable to researchers.
In this paper, we try to tackle both problems (mainly) by means of collect-
ing new information on the workers’ disclosure status. Disclosure information
helps us in two ways. First, we distinguish disclosed from undisclosed workers
and circumvent the problem that sexual orientation is not always an observable
characteristic to employers. And second, we combine disclosure information
with a simple discrimination model, and take a ￿rst step to uncover the extent
of discrimination in sexual orientation estimates. The intuition is as follows.
With undisclosed workers, we estimate the relation between sexual orientation
and earnings that is driven by productivity di￿erences, and not by employers
who discriminate. With disclosed workers, we estimate a similar relationship
and attribute the di￿erence in earnings to a combination of employer discrimi-
nation and di￿erences in productive traits. If disclosure is exogenous, implying
that the productive characteristics do not correlate with disclosure status, the
reduced-form estimates enable us to make a distinction between discrimination
and selection. If, on the other hand, disclosure is endogenous, we are still able
to bound the true impact of a discriminating labor market assuming various
economic relationships between the endogenous regressor and unobserved pro-
1Among the articles that are supportive of the discrimination hypothesis are Badgett
(1995); Klawitter and Flatt (1998); Arabsheibani et al. (2005). Articles that raise doubts
about the discrimination hypothesis include Berg and Lien (2002); Blandford (2003); Black
et al. (2003); Plug and Berkhout (2004).
2ductivity traits.
One of the advantages of this study is that our discrimination tests do not
rely on gender. In previous work we saw that lesbian/bisexual women sometimes
earn somewhat more than heterosexual women (Berg and Lien 2002; Blandford
2003; Black et al. 2003; Plug and Berkhout 2004). Although this observation
challenges the predictions of a discrimination model, it requires a careful in-
terpretation. As Black et al. (2003) argue, the earnings advantages of lesbian
workers over other women are not that informative about the nature of discrim-
ination against homosexual male and female workers if heterosexual women are
discriminated against as well. With disclosure information, we test for discrimi-
nation using only men and thus avoid potential discriminatory practices against
heterosexual and lesbian/bisexual women that may a￿ect their di￿erences in
pay.
Based on a survey that collects information on Dutch college graduates,
including information on the student’s sexual orientation and workplace dis-
closure, we are able to examine the following two issues. First, we estimate
the association between sexual orientation and male earnings based on a new
sample of Dutch college graduates, and ￿nd (consistent with previous) evidence
that gay/bisexual men earn less than other men, even in the beginning of a
working career. Second, we present new estimates on the e￿ect of workplace
disclosure on earnings. We ￿nd, much to our own surprise, that the di￿erence in
earnings between gay/bisexual and heterosexual men is entirely driven by those
gays/bisexuals that work for employers who are unaware about their sexual ori-
entation. When we try to interpret our results, we dismiss discrimination as one
of the underlying mechanisms and consider existing selection theories, including
the identity model (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) and family specialization model
(Becker 1981), as possible alternatives. Our results are most consistent with
the notion that among men gay/bisexual workers specialize less in marketable
skills.2
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 models the relation between sexual
orientation and earnings, focuses on the problem that sexual orientation is not
generally an observable characteristic, and shows under which conditions we
can make a distinction between discrimination and selection e￿ects. Section 3
describes the data on Dutch university graduates, and provides a discussion on
2After we sent out our survey {issued in 2004{ to collect disclosure information to answer
questions about discrimination and sexual orientation, it came to our attention that Comolli
(2005) also examined the relationship between gay/bisexual earnings and disclosure. With
data on gay/bisexual single workers in four US cities, he ￿nds that disclosed workers earn less
(and not more) than undisclosed workers. Our study di￿ers from the work of Comolli in at
least two directions. First, his research focuses exclusively on gay/bisexual workers and has
little to say about di￿erences in earnings between gay/bisexual and heterosexual male workers.
Second, he uses a switching regression model to allow for endogenous disclosure and relies on
instrumental variables/exclusion restrictions that are either statistically weak (age at which
respondents ￿rst wondered they were gay) or unconvincing (the extent to which respondents
feel part of the gay community).
3our workplace disclosure measure. Section 4 presents the parameter estimates.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Testing for Discrimination
In this Section we explore whether we can empirically test for discrimination
against gay/bisexual workers, if sexual orientation is not always observable to
employers and we have information on the workers’ disclosure status. In our
empirical model we concentrate on earnings discrimination and estimate an
earnings equation of the form
Yi = ￿DHi + ￿Xi + ￿i; (1)
where i indexes the worker, Y is a measure of earnings, H is a measure of
sexual orientation that equals 1 for gay/bisexual workers and 0 otherwise, D is
a disclosure index that equals 1 for workers whose sexual orientation is known
to employers and 0 otherwise, X is a set of other (observed and unobserved)
variables assumed to a￿ect earnings, and ￿ is the remaining error assumed to
be uncorrelated with Y (and its determinants H and X). We let parameter ￿D
vary with disclosure status
￿D = ￿ + ￿D; (2)
to accommodate that prejudiced employers can only discriminate against gay/bi-
sexual workers with disclosed identity. That is, the e￿ect of sexual orientation
on earnings re￿ects unobserved productivity di￿erences between gay/bisexual
and heterosexual workers (￿) and possibly discrimination against sexual orien-
tation (￿ < 0). The standard problem of identifying ￿ empirically, however, is
that disclosure is likely to be correlated with unobserved productivity traits.
The empirical strategy we propose to identify ￿ consists of two parts. The
￿rst part tests for discrimination under the assumption of exogenous disclosure.
The second and more important part explores the sensitivity of our estimated
discrimination e￿ects to productivity assumptions that are less restrictive but
(￿rmly) rooted in economic theory.
Exogenous disclosure
Our least-squares coe￿cient ^ ￿ detects discrimination against gay/bisexual work-
ers only if disclosure itself is an exogenous event. In our empirical model ex-
ogenous disclosure implies that unobserved productive characteristics do not
correlate with disclosure status. To formalize this argument, we let ￿X1
1 be
a measure of average productivity for gay/bisexual workers whose orientation
is observable to employers; ￿X0
1 be a measure of the average productivity for
gay/bisexual workers whose orientation is not observable to employers; and ￿X0
be a measure of the average productivity for heterosexual workers. If we treat
4all relevant productivity traits as unobserved, estimate a stripped version of
equation (1) and regress Y only on H and HD, we obtain estimates of ￿ and ￿
with following properties
^ ￿LS = ￿(X0
1 ￿ X0); ^ ￿LS = ￿ + ￿(X1
1 ￿ X0
1): (3)
It is easy to see that identi￿cation of discrimination against gay/bisexual workers
requires that ￿X1
1 = ￿X0
1. If disclosure is exogenous, we obtain two interesting
estimates: one discrimination estimate ^ ￿LS that measures the degree of dis-
crimination against gay/bisexual workers, and another selection estimate ^￿LS
that measures unobserved productivity di￿erences between gay/bisexual and
heterosexual men.
Endogenous Disclosure
An important feature, however, is that the disclosure decision is not always
exogenous. If gay/bisexual workers choose to be open about their sexual orien-
tation, our method does not work anymore and produces biased discrimination
estimates to the extent that disclosed and undisclosed workers di￿er in their pro-
ductive traits (￿X1
1 6= ￿X0
1). Our remedy to deal with endogenous disclosure
is to relax the assumption of exogenous disclosure, impose various productivity
orderings among gay/bisexual and heterosexual workers that are consistent with
(conventional) economic theories, and place (lower) bounds on the true degree
of discrimination against gay/bisexual workers. 3
According to Black et al. (2007) there are two (non-discriminating) economic
theories that link labor market outcomes to sexual orientation. The ￿rst the-
ory is Becker’s family model in which gay/bisexual workers (whether known or
unknown to their employer) are less likely to have children, gain less from spe-
cialization in market production, and as a consequence accumulate fewer mar-
ketable skills (Becker 1981). 4 If we assume that disclosed gay/bisexual workers
are indeed less productive than heterosexual workers, our estimate ^￿LS + ^ ￿LS
ampli￿es the extent of discrimination against gay/bisexual workers. With a
negative ￿, this means that we interpret ^ ￿LS + ^ ￿LS as a lower bound, namely
^ ￿LS + ^ ￿LS = ￿ + ￿(X1
1 ￿ X0) ￿ ￿ if ￿X1
1 ￿ ￿X0: (4)
The second theory to consider here is the identity model of Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2000). They argue that a worker’s utility not only re￿ects outcomes but
also identity, de￿ned by a particular set of behavioral prescriptions. With our
3An alternative procedure to identify discrimination e￿ects without assuming exogenous
disclosure would be an instrumental variable approach. However, with the data at hand it is
impossible for us to come up with an instrument that is credibly valid.
4Others have argued that gay/bisexual men are paid less than other men because they have,
on average, more feminine traits. If we consider specialization as the result of comparative
advantages that are exogenous (innate) and/or endogenous (develop over time), this particular
notion does not substantially di￿er from the one put forward by Becker.
5focus on earnings and sexual identity, their model implies that the decision
to disclose constitutes a tradeo￿ between identity-based utility gains and non-
discriminatory costs: that is, disclosed workers must conform to behavioral
prescriptions that do not pay (well). The observation, for example, that openly
gay/bisexual men tend to prefer more feminine (and less rewarding) occupa-
tions can be understood as such an identity enhancing mechanism. If Akerlof
and Kranton are correct and disclosure is more common among low productive
gay/bisexual workers, we observe that
^ ￿LS = ￿ + ￿(X1
1 ￿ X0
1) ￿ ￿ if ￿X1
1 ￿ ￿X0
1; (5)
where our discrimination estimate ^ ￿LS, albeit a lower bound, is actually overes-
timating the impact of a discriminating labor market. 5
We are aware that the alternative (and less restrictive) assumptions to gener-
ate lower bounds may not receive unquestioned acceptance. In our later analysis
we will therefore look for some (associative) evidence to validate the suggested
relationships between the endogenous regressor and unobserved productivity
traits.
3 Data, Sample and Measurement
Our analysis employs data from an annual survey of individuals who completed
college education in the Netherlands. 6 The survey is a questionnaire which
contains questions on education, work history since graduation and personal
characteristics. The survey focuses on recent graduates. That is, individuals
who are interviewed graduated in the academic year two years earlier. Yearly
around 30,000 questionnaires are sent out and the response rate is about 30
percent. Now the data contain 10 cohorts of graduates in the beginning of their
working career, interviewed between 1997 and 2006.
5We should emphasize that we derive our particular productivity ordering from interpreting
identity theory within a non-discriminating environment. If we would interpret identity theory
within the context of a discriminating labor market, meaning that disclosed and undisclosed
workers anticipate earnings discrimination, it is possible that disclosed workers end up being
more (and not less) productive than undisclosed workers. In this case our discrimination test
fails. If we formally introduce anticipation and let the decision threshold to disclose shift with
a factor ￿, we can show that a negative ^ ￿LS is no longer informative about discrimination
^ ￿LS = ￿ + ￿(X1
1 ￿ X0
1) ￿ 0 if ￿X1
1 + ￿ ￿ ￿X0
1:
The same equation also shows that identity theory within a discriminating environment always
predicts a negative ^ ￿LS. In Section 4 we will use this result to conclude that in our sample
the identity mechanism is essentially not observed.
6Dutch college education can be divided into two tracks: higher vocational education and
university education. Higher vocational education prepares students for speci￿c (categories of)
professions, is taught at about 60 special institutes, and its graduates obtain a bachelor degree.
University education has a more general, academic character, is provided by 13 universities,
and its graduates can obtain bachelor but also master degrees.
6In this paper we focus our attention on the latter three cohorts that in-
clude information on sexual orientation as well as the degree of openness at the
workplace.7 Of the initial 11,767 male graduates in the 2003/2004, 2004/2005
and 2005/2006 survey, we restrict ourselves to full-time working men (32 and
more hours per week) for whom we have complete information on earnings,
which reduces our sample to 10,132 observations. We further excluded all work-
ers that were self-employed, worked for temporary employment agencies, earned
less than one euro per hour, and for whom data on the various control variables
were unavailable. In the end, we are left with a sample of 7,158 male workers,
of which 435 are gay (324) or bisexual (111). Descriptive statistics for the most
important variables are provided in Table 1.
Measurement of Sexual Orientation and Workplace Disclosure
In the empirical literature on the economics on sexual orientation three sex-
ual orientation measures are currently in use: measures based on (past) sexual
experiences; measures based on partnership; and self-reported orientation mea-
sures. These measures do not fully overlap and may capture di￿erent aspects of
sexual orientation. A series of recent papers in economics (Badgett 1995; Black
et al. 2003; Plug and Berkhout 2004; Comolli 2005; Carpenter 2005 2007) re-
late these di￿erent aspects to the extent of workplace disclosure and argue that
some measures of sexual orientation are more informative to employers (and
fellow workers) than others. Within a labor market setting, for example, sex-
ual orientation measures based on partnership are more relevant than measures
based on past sexual behavior, simply because it is much easier for employers
to obtain information on the gender of the employee’s partner, than on whom
an employee spent his time in bed with. A variable that measures the extent of
workplace disclosure would resolve part of the discussion, but is rarely collected
in large systematic data sets.
Not in our data. Regarding sexual orientation, the former college gradu-
ates are asked whether they are sexually attracted to men, women or both.
Together with the graduates’ gender we identify sexual orientation. Regarding
workplace disclosure, we ask all identi￿ed gay/bisexual graduates that work at
the time of data collection whether their employers/fellow-workers know their
sexual orientation, and whether they themselves are open about their sexu-
ality at work. This enables us to construct two disclosure indicators. One
measures disclosure directly: employers/collegues just know the sexual orienta-
tion of their employees/fellow-workers. The other one measures disclosure in-
directly: employers/collegues might know the sexual orientation from the open
gay/bisexual lifestyle employees/fellow-workers lead (at work). In our data, we
￿nd that the nondisclosure shares among gay/bisexual workers at the beginning
7Only in our 2003/2004, 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 survey data we collect information on
the extent of workplace disclosure.
7of their working are substantial. Depending on the de￿nition of workplace dis-
closure, about 40 to 60 percent of all the gay/bisexual workers in our sample
work for employers who are ignorant about their sexual identity.
Note that sexual orientation question as well as the openness questions are
part of a special section at the end of the questionnaire that concentrated on
general individual and household characteristics. The fact that we infer infor-
mation on sexual identity and disclosure at the end of the survey, after all other
information is gathered, is an additional strength of our data. By doing so, we
circumvent potential selectivity in response behavior, when respondents belong-
ing to a sexual minority group would have taken the opportunity to emphasize
or even exaggerate problems encountered in relation to their sexual orientation.
4 Results
Table 2 presents least squares estimates of the relationship between the (log of)
hourly earnings and various measures of sexual orientation on samples of work-
ing heterosexual, homosexual and bisexual men, using varying sets of control
variables.
Because much of the empirical literature on the economics on sexual orienta-
tion has concentrated on estimating the e￿ect of sexual orientation on earnings,
we begin to discuss the estimated e￿ects of sexual orientation on the earnings
of all men. In panel A column (i) we regress earnings on a sexual orientation
dummy as the single right-hand-side variable and ￿nd that gay/bisexual work-
ers receive 4 percent less in hourly pay than heterosexual workers. In columns
(ii) and (iii) we add several other covariates. We ￿nd that the inclusion of
age, ethnicity, region, school characteristics, and job characteristics (includ-
ing 15 occupation indicators) has little e￿ect. The earnings penalty for being
gay/bisexual continues to be statistically signi￿cant, negative but small varying
between 3 and 4 percent. Our ￿ndings are, as such, comparable to those ob-
tained in previous studies: gay/bisexual men earn (somewhat) less than other
men (Badgett 1995; Berg and Lien 2002; Blandford 2003; Black et al. 2003;
Plug and Berkhout 2004; Comolli 2005; Carpenter 2005 2007).
Having empirically established that gay/bisexual men earn less than other
men, we next investigate to which extent the penalty for being gay/bisexual can
be explained (best) by discrimination theory, identity theory and/or specializa-
tion theory.
Discrimination
To better understand whether this sexual orientation e￿ect is a discrimina-
tion e￿ect (or a selection e￿ect for that matter), we must recognize that any
discrimination interpretation of the observed earnings penalty depends on the
employers’ ability to distinguish their employees’ sexual orientation. Equations
8(1) and (2) are designed to address this issue. If we treat the decision to disclose
as exogenous, the negative association between sexual orientation and wages, as
reported above, has important implications for disclosure and sexual orientation
e￿ects. If, for example, the negative correlation is entirely driven by discrimi-
nating employers, we expect the disclosure e￿ect to be negative and the sexual
orientation e￿ect to be zero ( ^ ￿LS < 0; ^ ￿LS = 0). If the negative association just
picks up selection e￿ects re￿ecting a negative relationship between gay/bisexual
workers and their unobserved earnings skills, we expect the disclosure e￿ect to
be zero and sexual orientation e￿ect to be negative ( ^ ￿LS = 0; ^ ￿LS < 0). And
if the penalty captures both discrimination and selection e￿ects, the earnings
e￿ects of disclosure and sexual orientation must be negative ( ^ ￿LS < 0; ^ ￿LS < 0).
In panel B we estimate the model we discussed in Section 2 and regress earn-
ings on a sexual orientation and disclosure dummy using our direct measure of
workplace (non)disclosure. Rather surprisingly, we ￿nd that none of the im-
plications suggested above matches with our sexual orientation and disclosure
estimates. Instead of a negative or zero disclosure coe￿cient, we ￿nd a positive
^ ￿LS in every speci￿cation. The sexual orientation coe￿cient ^ ￿LS is always neg-
ative. In column (i), for example, our estimates show that gay/bisexual workers
earn on average 9 percent less than other men, and that among gay/bisexual
workers those with disclosed identity earn on average 8 percent more. With
several other covariates added results fall but not by much. It is interesting to
note that the estimated coe￿cients ^ ￿LS and ^ ￿LS are similar in size but opposite
in sign: together they are always statistically insigni￿cant and very close to
0. This suggests that disclosed workers who are gay/bisexual earn as much as
heterosexual workers, and that the earnings penalty for being gay/bisexual, as
reported in Panel A, is primarily driven by those gay/bisexual workers who did
not disclose their sexual orientation to their employers (or fellow employees for
that matter). In panel C we estimate the same equation but switch to indirect
disclosure measures. With disclosure indicators based on the degree of openness
at work, our ￿ndings reported in the third panel do not substantially change.
The estimates again show that, among all men, only gay/bisexual workers that
are not open and perhaps purposely conceal their sexual identity earn signif-
icantly less. Independent of the speci￿cation used, the penalty for not being
open ^ ￿LS moves around the 5 percent. 8
If disclosure is exogenous, it is clear that our results cannot rationalize the
negative association between sexual orientation and wages. In particular, our
￿ndings indicate that gay/bisexual workers experience positive, rather than neg-
8In the empirical literature on sexual orientation and earnings it is common to pool gay
and bisexual workers. In this paper we follow this procedure. If we would re-estimate our
speci￿cations on samples of gay and heterosexual workers, we get estimates that are very
similar in sign, magnitude and signi￿cance level. According to the speci￿cation, as estimated
in Table 2 column (iii), the point estimates, in case we exclude all bisexual workers from our
sample, are found to be -0.030 [0.010]; -0.071 [0.20] and 0.054 [0.023]; -0.043 [0.014] and 0.26
[0.20] in Panels A, B and C, respectively (with standard errors between brackets).
9ative, discrimination with a premium that varies between 3 to 8 percent. These
unconventional numbers, however, should not be taken too literally (yet), and
call into question whether the decision to disclose is truly exogenous, an issue
to which we shall turn next to.
Identity
Since we do not believe that positive discrimination serves as a credible expla-
nation for our ￿ndings, we conclude that the exogenous disclosure assumption
is violated, and that our discrimination estimates as discussed above are biased.
In particular, the bias we observe suggests that among gay/bisexual workers
disclosed workers are abler workers, and therefore earn higher wages, even in a
labor market that discriminates.
At ￿rst sight, identity theory seems to be an appropriate alternative: it does
not assume that the decision to disclose is completely orthogonal to observed
and unobserved productivity traits, and it allows for disclosed workers to be
(somewhat) more productive than undisclosed workers (see footnote 5). How-
ever, identity theory fails to predict the disclosure premium we observe in every
speci￿cation. The implication of this observation is immediate: we rule out the
identity model as one of the underlying mechanisms.
Specialization
The household specialization model predicts that gay/bisexual workers end
up earning less then other male workers in a non-discriminating labor mar-
ket. As such, we observe that these predictions apply to undisclosed work-
ers. All the reported sexual orientation estimates ^ ￿LS are negative and inform
us that gay/bisexual workers, who are not discriminated against because em-
ployers are unaware about their sexual orientation, earn signi￿cantly less than
heterosexual workers. The specialization model, however, appears less evident
for disclosed workers. In fact, our observation that disclosed workers earn as
much as heterosexual workers is not informative about potential skill di￿er-
ences between gay/bisexual and heterosexual workers. If prejudiced employers
know their workers’ orientation and discriminate, these estimates imply that
disclosed gay/bisexual workers have more marketable skills than heterosexual
workers, and not less as the specialization theory predicts.
As a second approach, we therefore consider alternative predictions that
follow from a specialization model. As Becker (1981) explains, gay/bisexual
couples are less likely to have children, and because of that they may invest
less in their human capital and have a less extensive division of work. To ex-
plore the possible role of human capital and labor supply di￿erences between
gay/bisexual and heterosexual workers, we regress various human capital and
division of work outcomes on our set of sexual orientation measures and the
usual controls, including age, ethnicity, and region. If we look at educational
10di￿erences between (disclosed) gay/bisexual and heterosexual workers, the ev-
idence is mixed. In Table 3 we ￿nd some evidence against specialization in
columns (i) and (v), where our results indicate that, as students, gay/bisexual
workers received somewhat higher GPA scores in high school and college than
most other male workers. Evidence in favor of specialization, however, can be
found in columns (ii), (iii) and (vi) where we observe that the same gay/bisexual
workers have invested more in their feminine traits, displayed by greater ver-
bal ability and lower mathematical ability, and were more likely to graduate
in typically female (and less rewarding) ￿elds of study. 9 If we look at labor
supply patterns, evidence in favor of specialization is much stronger. Compared
to heterosexual male workers, our estimates show that (disclosed) gay/bisexual
workers work fewer hours, have partners that work more hours, and they report
to work much less in case they would live in families with children. 10
If we consider the men in our sample {college graduates, young and pre-
dominantly childless{ it is not a priori clear why the observed school and labor
outcomes of gay/bisexual workers provide some (weak) support for the the-
ory of household specialization. Perhaps this means that skill di￿erences be-
tween between gay/bisexual and heterosexual men are innate. Or perhaps this
means that skill di￿erences originate from di￿erences in expectations, where
gay/bisexual men anticipate not to live in traditional households with children
and because of that make di￿erent school and work choices. Understanding the
sources of specialization is important, but is too di￿cult to treat with available
data.
Synthesis
Our disclosure and sexual orientation estimates have two (rather pessimistic)
implications for the discrimination tests we set out in Section 2. First, our
￿ndings suggest that disclosed and undisclosed workers are di￿erent, and that
because of these di￿erences the method we propose fails in separating discrim-
ination e￿ects from selection e￿ects: our discrimination estimates as discussed
above are biased. Second, the bias we observe suggests that among gay/bisexual
workers disclosed workers are abler workers, and therefore earn higher wages,
even in a labor market that discriminates. Since this observation goes against
the predictions of the identity model (in which workers with disclosed identity
are willing to work for lower pay), we cannot use the di￿erence between the
disclosure and nondisclosure estimates to bound the impact of a discriminating
labor market. Thus two of the three discrimination tests we propose do not
work.
9When we include the share of men within each ￿eld of study (calculated at a three-digit-
level) as an additional control in our earnings regressions, we ￿nd that the estimated return to
male dominated ￿elds of study equals 0.025 [0.012] (with standard errors shown in brackets).
Note that the inclusion of male share as an additional control variable had no mediating e￿ect
on the nondisclosure penalty.
10In the Netherlands it is not uncommon for gay couples to adopt children.
11On a brighter note, the remaining discrimination test that rests on special-
ization theory can still detect (the absence of) labor market discrimination. The
argument is as follows. Since disclosed gay/bisexual workers earn as much as
heterosexual workers, we know that discrimination theory and specialization
theory are mutually exclusive, at least in our sample. This means that only one
of them can be true. The data weakly favors specialization theory over discrim-
ination theory, even though our discrimination estimates themselves are biased
and therefore not conclusive. But if Becker got it right and the disclosed workers
in our sample show a mild tendency to behave as family specializers, which they
do, we must conclude that the labor market does not discriminate against sexual
orientation, at least not against young working college gay/bisexual graduates
in the Netherlands which is known to be one of the more tolerant countries
towards sexual minorities.
5 Concluding Remarks
In 1995 Badgett mentioned that a variable measuring the extent of workplace
disclosure of gay identity would be more appropriate to include in the wage
equation, since disclosure is necessary for workplace discrimination to occur.
One decade later, we follow up on her suggestion, collect new information on
workplace disclosure, and develop a simple (and possibly valuable) strategy to
assess the role of discrimination in sexual orientation estimates.
In our strategy the exogeneity of the disclosure decision plays a key role.
If disclosure is exogenous, implying that the productive characteristics do not
correlate with disclosure status, we show that information on disclosure is useful
in separating discrimination e￿ects from selection e￿ects. Our data, however,
reject exogenous disclosure. Would this identi￿cation assumption hold, our
results indicate that gay/bisexual workers experience positive discrimination.
Since we do not believe that employers treat gay/bisexual workers favorably, we
conclude that disclosed workers earn signi￿cantly more than undisclosed workers
because of di￿erences in productive traits.
If we replace the exogenous disclosure assumption with productivity assump-
tions that are less restrictive, we show that information on disclosure can still be
useful in bounding discrimination e￿ects. We derive bounding assumptions from
existing theories of specialization and identity. Our data appears to be most
consistent with Becker’s specialization model in which gay/bisexual workers are
less likely to specialize in market production, and as a consequence accumulate
fewer marketable skills. If we accept that gay/bisexual workers tend to act as
if they are family specializers, then the proper interpretation of our results is
that labor market discrimination cannot be held responsible for the observed
di￿erences in earnings between gay/bisexual and heterosexual workers.
Of course, an important question is what is the external validity of our
analysis. As we have discussed throughout, the results we ￿nd are speci￿c to a
12group of young working college graduates in the Netherlands. Our observation
of absent discrimination against gay/bisexual workers may, for example, not
be relevant for older generations in the labor market. If gay/bisexual workers
experience losses in earnings because they more frequently end up in dead-
end jobs or face glass ceilings, it is likely that discrimination estimates based on
starters miss these e￿ects. In addition, our results are speci￿c to the Netherlands
and may not hold in other societies either. It is not clear, though, that this is
a limitation of our study. Since the Netherlands is one of the more tolerant
countries towards sexual minorities, we actually believe that studying earnings
e￿ects in this particular country adds a potential value to this study.
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14TABLE 1{Summary Statistics for Some Selected Variables
Hetero Disclosed Undisclosed
males G/B males G/B males G/B males
(N = 6; 723) (N = 435) (N = 267) (N = 168)
Labor market outcomes:
hourly wages 9.837 2.411 9.506 2.599 9.814 2.630 8.982 1.822
Labor supply outcomes:
hours worked 38.840 2.939 38.242 2.909 38.221 2.995 38.277 2.765
hours worked partner 27.986 14.93 33.522 12.82 34.981 12.20 27.643 13.72
stated hours worked, 33.245 5.677 30.358 6.122 30.051 6.253 30.940 5.854
in hypothetical family with partner and child
Individual characteristics:
age 26.689 3.072 26.433 2.901 26.521 3.280 26.283 2.102
ethnicity 0.057 0.072 0.035 0.137
north 0.073 0.054 0.046 0.068
east 0.186 0.221 0.180 0.291
south 0.225 0.241 0.263 0.202
west 0.515 0.484 0.511 0.439
Disclosure characteristics:
known to employer/collegues 0.631 1.000 0.000
open lifestyle 0.411 0.601 0.086
Various human capital outcomes:
GPA (high-school)
a 6.966 0.600 7.040 0.619 7.034 0.614 7.049 0.629
math grades (high-school)
b 6.516 1.202 6.393 1.226 6.376 1.244 6.422 1.199
language grades (high-school)
c 6.834 0.693 6.957 0.749 6.975 0.714 6.925 0.806
MA 0.437 0.445 0.477 0.390
GPA (college) 7.127 0.539 7.238 0.571 7.249 0.564 7.221 0.586
gender share in college 0.620 0.235 0.493 0.253 0.477 0.253 0.520 0.251
years of parents’ schooling 11.698 2.747 11.634 2.574 11.896 2.598 11.186 2.479
a In high school and college grades range from 1 (worst) to 10 (best).
b In high school students may matriculate in two types of math, where type B math is considerably more advanced than
type A math. The better students enroll in math B and often (40 percent) take math A on the side. Of those who do, the
math A grade is on average 1 points higher than the math B grade. We therefore measure math grade as the maximum of
the students math B grade and math A grade minus 1.
c In high school all students matriculate in Dutch and English. To measure language grade we take averages.TABLE 2{Least Squares Estimates of Sexual Orientation Effects on Hourly Earnings
(i) (ii) (iii)
A. Sexual Orientation Effects on Earnings.
G/B (^ ￿D) {0.036 0.011*** {0.029 0.009*** {0.035 0.009***
B. Sexual Orientation Effects on Earnings for (Un)Disclosed Workers (using Direct Disclosure).
G/B (^ ￿) {0.087 0.017*** {0.065 0.015*** {0.071 0.014***
G/B known to employer/collegues ( ^ ￿) 0.080 0.022*** 0.058 0.019*** 0.057 0.018***
^ ￿ + ^ ￿ {0.006 0.013 {0.007 0.012 {0.014 0.011
C. Sexual Orientation Effects on Earnings for (Un)Disclosed Workers (using Indirect Disclosure).
G/B (^ ￿) {0.055 0.014*** {0.045 0.012*** {0.048 0.012***
G/B open lifestyle ( ^ ￿) 0.045 0.021** 0.040 0.018** 0.030 0.017*
^ ￿ + ^ ￿ {0.009 0.016 {0.005 0.014 {0.018 0.013
Controls:
Individual, human-
capital, region | ￿ ￿
Occupation, industry,
job characteristics | | ￿
Note.| Standard errors in italics; ***signi￿cant at 1% level; **signi￿cant at 5% level; *signi￿cant at 10% level; All regres-




(i) Mathematics Language (iv) (v) Field of
GPA Grades Grades BA/MA GPA Study
(high-school) (high-school) (high-school) (college) (college) (college)
(N=6,948) (N=6,576) (N=6,756) (N=7,158) (N=7,080) (N=7,158)
A. Sexual Orientation Effects on Human Capital Outcomes.
G/B (^ ￿D) 0.074 {0.127 0.126 0.025 0.114 {0.130
0.029** 0.061** 0.034*** 0.022 0.025*** 0.011***
B. Sexual Orientation Effects on Human Capital Outcomes for (Un)Disclosed Workers (using Direct Disclosure).
G/B (^ ￿) 0.091 {0.087 0.099 {0.010 0.102 {0.104
0.047* 0.099 0.055* 0.036 0.041** 0.018***
G/B known to employer/collegues ( ^ ￿)
a {0.027 {0.063 0.042 0.055 0.019 {0.041
0.058 0.122 0.068 0.044 0.052 0.022*
^ ￿ + ^ ￿
b 0.064 {0.150 0.142 0.045 0.121 {0.145
0.036* 0.076** 0.042*** 0.027 0.032*** 0.013***
C. Sexual Orientation Effects on Human Capital Outcomes for (Un)Disclosed Workers (using Indirect Disclosure).
G/B (^ ￿) 0.124 0.024 0.134 0.034 0.178 {0.119
0.037*** 0.079 0.055*** 0.029 0.033*** 0.014***
G/B open lifestyle ( ^ ￿)
a {0.124 {0.354 {0.020 {0.024 {0.158 {0.026
0.057*** 0.119*** 0.067 0.044 0.051*** 0.022
^ ￿ + ^ ￿
b 0.001 {0.329 0.114 0.010 0.019 {0.145
0.045 0.092*** 0.053** 0.034 0.040 0.017***
Note.| Standard errors in italics; ***signi￿cant at 1% level; **signi￿cant at 5% level; *signi￿cant at 10% level. All
regressions include additional controls for the worker’s the child’s age, ethnicity, region of residence, and survey year.
a This parameter measures the di￿erences in outcomes between disclosed and undisclosed workers.
b The sum of the parameters ￿ and ￿ measures the di￿erences in outcomes between gay/bisexual workers with disclosed
identity and heterosexual workers.TABLE 3 CONT’D{Estimating the Effect of Sexual Orientation on Various Human Capital and Labor Supply Outcomes of Men
(x)
(vii) (ix) Hours Worked
Parent’s (viii) Partners’ in Hypothetical Case of
Years of Hours Worked Hours Worked Family with Children
Schooling (realized) (realized) (stated)
(N=7,153) (N=7,158) (N=3,231) (N=4,485)
A. Sexual Orientation Effects on Labor Supply Outcomes.
G/B (^ ￿D) {0.038 {0.612 5.241 {2.927
0.128 0.139*** 1.151*** 0.347***
B. Sexual Orientation Effects on Labor Supply Outcomes for (Un)Disclosed Workers (using Direct Disclosure).
G/B (^ ￿) {0.424 {0.555 0.174 {2.385
0.207** 0.223** 2.529 0.581***
G/B known to employer/collegues ( ^ ￿)
a 0.610 {0.090 6.331 {0.823
0.207** 0.278 2.814** 0.709
^ ￿ + ^ ￿
b 0.186 {0.645 6.504 {3.209
0.159 0.172*** 1.279*** 0.424***
C. Sexual Orientation Effects on Labor Supply Outcomes for (Un)Disclosed Workers (using Indirect Disclosure).
G/B (^ ￿) {0.090 {0.571 4.742 {2.331
0.165 0.178*** 1.539*** 0.451***
G/B open lifestyle ( ^ ￿)
a 0.124 {0.099 1.101 {1.401
0.252 0.272 2.254 0.680**
^ ￿ + ^ ￿
b 0.034 {0.669 5.844 {3.732
0.196 0.212*** 1.685*** 0.523***
Note.| Standard errors in italics; ***signi￿cant at 1% level; **signi￿cant at 5% level; *signi￿cant at 10% level. All
regressions include additional controls for the worker’s the child’s age, ethnicity, region of residence, and survey year.
a This parameter measures the di￿erences in outcomes between disclosed and undisclosed workers.
b The sum of the parameters ￿ and ￿ measures the di￿erences in outcomes between gay/bisexual workers with disclosed
identity and heterosexual workers.